Secure Biosystems Design in Saccharomyces Cerevisiae Establishes Effective Biocontainment Strategies and Mechanisms of Escape

The widespread application of recombinant DNA and synthetic biology approaches for microbial metabolic engineering pursuits has motivated the development of biocontainment strategies, targeting safe and secure deployment of genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs). However, the design rules and mechanistic drivers governing biocontainment efficacy, as well as impacts of biocontainment upon microbial fitness, remain to be comprehensively evaluated, hindering predictive design and application of these strategies. We have developed a platform for high-resolution analysis of a transactivated kill switch in laboratory and industrial strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae to assess modes of biocontainment escape and establish design rules for development of kill switch systems in diverse microbes. A camphor-regulated, RelE toxin system was systematically deployed to assess the impacts of differential kill switch copy number and ploidy in laboratory vs industrial strains. CRISPR-mediated integration of the biocontainment system at various loci revealed rapid escape events driven, in part, by mutations to both the Cam-transactivator (cam-TA) and RelE toxin. Genetic engineering enabled recapitulation of escape phenotypes, confirming mechanisms of escape and establishing structure-function relationships in the cam-TA system. Interestingly, genomic resequencing of escape mutants also revealed a series of off-target mutations, implicating additional modes of kill switch escape. Multi-copy integration of the kill switch system mitigated these effects by orders of magnitude, without compromising the biosynthetic capacity of the microbes, but proved insufficient to establish sustained biocontainment. The resultant data define a series of key design rules for next-generation biocontainment strategies and add to a growing foundational knowledge base targeting establishment of secure biosystems designs.